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ABSTRACT
This report is a collection and review of system operation and failure experiences for air
ventilation systems in nuclear facilities.  These experiences are applicable for magnetic
and inertial fusion facilities since air ventilation systems are support systems that can be
considered generic to nuclear facilities.  The report contains descriptions of ventilation
system components, operating experiences with these systems, component failure rates,
and component repair times.  Since ventilation systems have a role in mitigating accident
releases in nuclear facilities, these data are useful in safety analysis and risk assessment of
public safety.  An effort has also been given to identifying any safety issues with
personnel operating or maintaining ventilation systems.  Finally, the recommended failure
data were compared to an independent data set to determine the accuracy of individual
values.  This comparison is useful for the International Energy Agency task on fusion
component failure rate data collection.
vSUMMARY
This report is a collection of design and reliability information on ventilation systems
applicable to magnetic and laser fusion experiments.  Ventilation is an important plant
system since it can control concentrations of radioactive particulate and gases, and also
concentrations of toxicological materials.  General ventilation system components are
discussed, and typical equipment operating parameters are given.  Design issues, such as
air flow rates and ventilation zone pressures, are given from Department of Energy
guidance and direction.  Operating experiences with ventilation systems in nuclear
facilities have been outlined to show the types of events that could occur.  Sometimes,
ventilation systems do not respond as desired in off-normal events.  These experiences
are applicable to magnetic and inertial fusion facilities since air ventilation systems are
support systems that can be considered generic to nuclear facilities.  Personnel safety
issues for operators and maintainers have been addressed as well.  Ventilation system
component failure rates and representative average repair times have been selected from
the literature.  The chosen failure rate values have been compared to independent data
from non-nuclear applications to determine how general the data values are between
industries.  Generally, military equipment data are the most rigorously collected and
analyzed data after nuclear power plant data, and these values were used for comparison.
Most of the comparison values were fair, and some values were poor.  Nonetheless, the
data presented are the most applicable for nuclear facility ventilation systems and can be
used for safety or risk analyses of general ventilation systems at fusion facilities.
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ACRONYMS
AGS American Glovebox Society
AHU air handling unit
ASHRAE American Society of Heating, Refrigerating, and Air Conditioning
Engineers
DOE Department of Energy
DOP dioctyl phthalate, a chemical for testing filtration efficiency
HEPA high efficiency particulate air filter
HVAC Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning
INEEL Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory
ITER International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor
NSSR-2 Non-site Specific Safety Report, revision 2
Pa Pascal of pressure
PM preventive maintenance
psig pounds per square inch, gauge
RAM reliability-availability-maintainability
rpm revolutions per minute
TSTA Tritium Systems Test Assembly at Los Alamos National Laboratory
Vac Volts, alternating current
VFD variable frequency drive
/d per demand to operate
/h per hour of operation
/h-m per hour of operation and meter of length
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1VENTILATION SYSTEMS OPERATING EXPERIENCE
REVIEW FOR FUSION APPLICATIONS
1. INTRODUCTION
During the course of the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER)
engineering design, analysts noted that many of the postulated accident events discussed
in the Non-site Specific Safety Report (NSSR-2) ended in a stack release of radioactive or
chemical effluents to the environment.  Releasing radionuclides from the stack provides
two important safety-conservative features.  The release is elevated, which leads to better
dispersion in the atmosphere than a ground level release.  The other feature is that the
radionuclides are also mixed with the high flow rate stack air, which leads to diluted
concentrations of the radionuclides.  Both of these features are important to reduce the
radiological dose to the public.  Maintaining a stack release rather than a ground level
release was important for meeting safety objectives of the ITER design (FDR, 1998).
Typically, a heating, ventilating, and air conditioning (HVAC) system provides for
human comfort by supplying appropriate air quality, maintaining comfortable temperature
and humidity conditions, and providing filtration of building air for cleanliness and
freshness.  Air circulation may also be used for heat transfer from some types of powered
equipment, such as electrical motor control centers.  For nuclear fusion facilities,
including tritium handling facilities, these ventilation functions must be directly coupled
to the confinement function for radionuclides (tritium, activated dusts, and any other
activated gaseous or aerosol materials).  While detritiation systems operate to remove
tritium from the air in a room so that the air can be released, the ventilation system must
isolate to work in cooperation with the detritiation system.  This cooperation is needed so
that the room air is not vented to the facility stack before it has been detritiated to an
appropriate level.  The ventilation system is also responsible for filtering radioactive
aerosols from the air before stacking the air to the environment.  Filter media or scrubbers
might accomplish filtration.  These cooperative functions make the ventilation system
very important for mitigating possible accidents at a fusion facility.
Ventilation systems are not a trivial support system.  Ventilation is an important
confinement barrier for radiological, biological, or toxicological hazards.  Considering the
Sellafield reprocessing plant, the three-building complex has 58 fans, 1,000 dampers, and
10 miles of ductwork.  The ventilation system capital cost was £11M, or about 3.5% of
total facility construction cost.  The electricity to run the fans costs over £20M per year.
This cost does not include the replacement filter costs or any other maintenance cost
(Doig, 1998).
This report addresses ventilating system component technology, operating experiences,
personnel safety issues related to ventilation, the component failure rates and repair rates
of ventilating system components.  Ventilation is the focus here rather than the entire
HVAC system.
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32. VENTILATION SYSTEM OPERATING EXPERIENCES
This section summarizes some operating experiences from nuclear ventilating systems.
These experiences provide insights to possible initiating events involving the ventilating
system.  While these systems are not thought to retain radioactive or hazardous materials,
there can be material buildup in the filtration units, and aerosol particles have been
known to plate out on the duct interior, so these materials slowly accumulate over time
and could be released in a system off-normal event.
This section begins with a brief description of the design philosophy used for nuclear
ventilation systems.  Then the technology used with basic components found in
ventilating systems is discussed.
2.1 Ventilation system design
Ventilation is always arranged to sweep air from uncontaminated areas to mild
contamination or potentially contaminated areas, then to more heavily contaminated areas
if the designer anticipates such contamination.  Then the air is filtered to remove
particulate and then is stacked to the atmosphere.  Figure 1 shows the design air flow
direction for nuclear confinement as defined by the American Society of Heating,
Refrigerating, and Air-conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE) (ASHRAE, 1993).  This type
of air flow is typical for radioactive contamination areas, so that contamination is not
spread by flowing air to lesser contaminated areas.  The reverse of this air flow pattern is
used in clean rooms, where the primary concern is to filter and slightly pressurize air in
the primary room; letting air leak outward to other rooms.  In that way, the clean room
does not have any admission of dust, aerosols, or other contaminants into the clean room
processes.  This report will focus on ventilation systems used for radioactive zoning, as
depicted in Figure 1.
Department of Energy (DOE) ventilation design guidance (ASHRAE, 1993; DOE, 1999)
suggests that for primary confinement, such as gloveboxes, the volumetric air change rate
should be up to 30 air changes per hour.  This is a very high flow rate and may be
warranted for some applications.  Some typical glovebox air change rates used in practice
for gloveboxes that handle particulate are 5 to 7 air volume changes per hour
(Cadwallader, 1998).  The primary confinement glovebox design at the Tritium Systems
Test Assembly (TSTA) does not continually purge the gloveboxes.  A set of solenoid
valves control nitrogen gas inflow from the gas storage system and outflow to the gas
cleanup system.  When glovebox pressure changes, tritium over 1 mCi/m
3
 is sensed, or
oxygen content greater than 2% is sensed, the controller opens the nitrogen supply and
exhaust valves (Cadwallader, 1992).  For the 13 full-time glove- boxes at TSTA, varying
between 1 to 3.6 m
3
 volume for a total of 29 m
3
, the nitrogen gas flow rate is between 10
to 15 m
3
/hour.  If all gloveboxes were to draw nitrogen flow, the flow rate would be about
30 m
3
/hour.  Therefore, the average gas purging is between 0.33 to 0.5 nitrogen changes
per hour, with a peak of about 1 change per hour.  If only one glovebox needs to be
swept, it can change between 4 to 10 nitrogen volumes per hour.
4Figure 1.  Typical ventilation zone design.
5 The recommended confinement system differential pressures are given in Table 1
(ASHRAE, 1993).  The TSTA gloveboxes operate at 500 Pa below normal atmospheric
pressure for Los Alamos.  The atmospheric pressure at Los Alamos is about 78.6 kPa at
that altitude.  Initial operation of the gloveboxes was at static (atmospheric) pressure to
500 Pa above atmospheric pressure because of concerns for air inleakage that could have
led to tritium conversion to the more hazardous oxide form, or to combustion.  After
several years of operation, a change was made to operate at 500 Pa below atmospheric
pressure.  This change was made to reduce the likelihood of tritium leakage into the room
that housed the gloveboxes.  The + 500 Pa glovebox experiences had shown that the
concern about air inleakage was not as important as the chance of small amounts of
tritium leaking into the room.  While the TSTA negative pressure is lower than the
pressure recommended in Table 1 and means that there might be extra expense to treat
the nitrogen atmosphere, it is safety conservative.
Another important ventilation requirement is the velocity to move air through a breach
opening.  Considering a glovebox as the primary confinement, there has long been a
guideline of drawing at least 100 feet/minute velocity of air or gas through a breached
gloveport (Walton, 1958; Burchsted, 1976; ASHRAE, 1993).  The American Glovebox
Society (AGS) suggests 125 ± 25 feet/minute air flow into a breached gloveport (AGS,
1998).  Similar velocities of 60 to 100 feet/minute are also suggested for laboratory hood
openings.  That air velocity provides a laminar flow of air over the hood floor and wall
surfaces.  Higher speeds, over 125 feet/minute, will lead to air turbulence and to the waste
of stacking comfortable room air and increased energy use for fans.  Air turbulence can
cause vapors within the hood to be spilled from the hood to the room (NRC, 1981).
Design guidance for ventilation of secondary confinement zones is 4 to 8 air changes per
hour, to be compared against cooling requirements and makeup (outside) air requirements
to verify adequacy.  The makeup air requirements for fume hoods, open-faced hoods,
local exhaust ventilation, sweep air over benchtop radioactive experiments, etc., can
dictate the ventilation rates for secondary confinement zones (ASHRAE, 1993).  This
guidance is not always met; some facilities will operate with perhaps 2 or 3 air
changes/hour in the secondary ventilation zone.  Table 2 gives suggested air change rates.
Tertiary ventilation zones are radiologically clean areas that often contain offices or other
administrative areas, non-radiological (referred to as “clean”) workshops, storage rooms,
receiving areas, etc.  The ventilation requirements will depend on the air cooling and
quality needs when selecting the air change rates.  As a comparison, a typical office might
change air at 0.5 to 2 changes per hour.  Typical residential homes might have 0.33 to 0.5
air changes per hour by natural draft and leakage.  A very tightly built, well insulated
house might be in the 0.1 air change per hour range, while a drafty, loosely constructed
home (loose windows, etc.) can have well over 1 air change per hour.
Another ventilation system of interest to mention here is the system designed for the
Beryllium Technology Facility at Los Alamos.  This facility is being fabricated from an
existing building at Los Alamos.  New ventilation systems are being installed for this
6Table 1.  Recommended nuclear confinement system differential pressures
Differential Pressures (Pa)Type of facility
Primary zone to
secondary
Secondary zone to
tertiary
Tertiary zone to
atmospheric
pressure
New facility - 174 to - 248.6 - 24.8 to - 37 - 24.8 to – 37
Existing facility - 75 to - 248.6 - 7.5 to - 37 - 2.5 to 37
Confinement canyons or cells operate with a - 248.6 Pa pressure as a minimum
Gloveboxes with air, typically operate at – 174 to – 248.6 Pa
Gloveboxes with air typically have pressure alarms set at - 124 Pa
Gloveboxes with inert gas, typically operate at – 174 to - -373 Pa
Notes:
Sometimes a ventilation zone can be split into two areas, where one area has a greater
hazard than another area.
Glovebox pressure relief valves are typically set at – 99 Pa when needed in a design.
Table 2.  Suggested air change rates for nuclear confinement systems
Suggested air exchange rate (air changes per hour)Type of facility
Primary
confinement
Secondary
confinement
Tertiary
confinement
New facility Up to 30 4 to 8 0.5 to 2 (typical)
Existing facility
Often
less than 10
Often at
2 to 3
Often at
0.33 to 2
Notes:
Tertiary confinement air exchange rates may be dominated by ASHRAE requirements for
clean air per person in the occupancy rather than radiological control issues.
7beryllium machining and handling operation.  The general room ventilation will be once
through with 15 air changes per hour, and there will be local exhaust ventilation at point
of operation for polishing, grinding, lathing, milling, and cutting operations as well as
joining, coating, and other operations.  The ventilation is not energy efficient, but it is a
robust system for worker protection.  The air enters the ventilation system through pre-
filters (30% efficient filters) then through 95% efficient filters for 5 micron size particles.
The air then enters two half-capacity air handling units.  These variable frequency drive
(VFD) fans route air to the facility ventilation systems.  Exit air from the local exhaust
ventilation systems is drawn by a high pressure blower (250 horsepower) and sent
through a filter house (99.999% efficient for 0.5 micron particles) and then to a high
efficiency particulate air filter bank (99.97% efficient for 0.3 micron size particles).  The
two full-capacity VFD exhaust fans take the general room air flow and draw the air
through the same high efficiency filter bank.  Then the air is sent the 20 m tall exhaust
stack (also called an ejector).  The air flow patterns in the rooms are ceiling diffusers with
downward air flow, with exhaust air intakes near the floor level.  This flow pattern
reduces the particulate in the worker’s breathing zone.  The air pressure is monitored
throughout the ventilation system, as well as flow, temperature, and humidity.  When
pressure changes across the filters grow too large, the filters are changed.  The facility
must go to reduced operation status during filter changeouts and other ventilation system
maintenance.  The ventilation ducts will have fire detectors, and a mist humidifier is used
to maintain building humidity in the 25-30% range (Abeln, 1998).
2.2 Basic system components
A typical set of components are found in ventilation systems; these components are listed
in (DOE, 1994) and are given below:
Air sampling devices
Filters (carbon bed absorbers, absorption, HEPA, sand, glass fiber) and pre-filters
Scrubbers
Demisters
Vessel vent systems
Condensers
Distribution baffles
Fire-suppression systems
Fire and smoke dampers
Exhaust stacks
Fans
Coils
Heat removal systems, such as chilled water systems
Pressure and flow monitors
Radiation-monitoring devices
Criticality safe drain systems
Tornado dampers
8Of these components, the fan is the prime mover and can be considered the heart of a
ventilation system.  Ninety-nine percent of all air-moving applications are handled by
three types of fans: centrifugal, propeller, and axial units (Reason, 1983).  The fan wheel
geometry determines the shape of a fan’s pressure-flow characteristic curve, but the fan
must be correctly sized for its application to operate efficiently.  Nuclear air cleaning fans
are required to provide trouble-free service for long periods to time with a minimum of
maintenance.  Centrifugal fans are capable of providing that service when chosen
carefully.  Experience with in-line centrifugal and vane-axial fans has shown that these
units are also attractive since they have given good service.  Their straight through design
allows them to tolerate shock waves more easily than centrifugal fans, and these units
also withstand high humidity and temperature without failure or loss of efficiency
(Burchsted, 1976).  Fans typically operate between 600 and 3600 rpm, with size
depending on the quantity of air to be moved.  A typical centrifugal fan for industrial
operations might operate at 600 rpm, 500 Pa (2 inches of water), 115 m
3
/minute (4100
feet
3
/minute) at 3.7 kilowatts input power (Grimm, 1998).  The term blower is also used
for ventilating fans, generally large fans.  Ventilation systems in nuclear power plants
typically run continuously to provide the subatmospheric room or zone pressures
described in this section.  Containment fan cooler systems also run continuously to keep
the containment building air temperature down below high levels that could affect
equipment or people.  Mechanical and electrical equipment can suffer degradations at
high temperatures from loss of adequate lubrication or weakened electrical insulation.
Personnel should not work for any long period to time in rooms whose air temperature is
above 135°F (Bongarra, 1985).
Typically, fans for ventilation do not generate high pressures.  Instead, fans induce high
velocity in the air to move large quantities of air through ducts.  Fans may stand alone,
but are typically built into air handling units (AHUs), that include dampers, air
heating/cooling coils, ductwork connections, and a metal casing (Levenhagen, 1993;
Mull, 1998).  The air heating coils may be electrically heated or steam heated.  A
humidifier may also be a part of the AHU, either a steam jet humidifier, a pan-type
humidifier where water is evaporated into the air stream by electric heat or steam heating,
or a water atomizer.  Often the fan in an AHU is a centrifugal unit.  AHUs are found in
fission power plants (Lish, 1972) as well as fusion experiments, such as the Tokamak
Fusion Test Reactor and other experiments.  The technology for moving air is used
equally well in both applications.
Air is typically routed using ducts or duct work.  For offices and commercial buildings,
the ducts are generally rectangular cross section and made of sheet metal sections with
lock seams.  This type of duct work might be used in some nuclear facilities for non-
radiological areas, but the typical nuclear duct work is piping that meets American
Society of Mechanical Engineers code requirements for integrity during seismic events
and withstanding external pressures of accident events, up to 60 psig (Lish, 1972).  This
welded piping is much less prone to leakage than sheet metal ducts.  The air piping can be
stainless steel or carbon steel (ASME, 1989).
9Dampers are used to control the flow of air in the fan exhaust and in ducts.  Dampers can
either stop/start the flow of air or they can be used to mix air streams.  Usually, nuclear
applications use butterfly valves for stopping flow and dampers to route or mix air flows.
Parallel blade dampers are the most widely used type of damper (Levenhagen, 1993).  A
parallel blade damper is a horizontal set of aluminum, steel, or other metal plates (blades)
in the air stream.  These blades pivot on their long axis to overlap each other when they
close so that air flow paths are closed off in the duct.  As the blades pivot to open, flow
areas are uncovered to allow air flow.  Partial closure deflects the flowing air as needed
for mixing air streams.  The damper blades are driven by either pneumatic or electric
motors that are attached to linkage arms.  The linkage arms generally only move when
force is applied, but can also be designed to fail in a specified position.  For pneumatic
motors, air pressure in the 3 to 15 psig range works against a diaphragm and a spring.  A
linkage arm is attached to the diaphragm, so that when the diaphragm moves, the linkage
transmits force to the blades and they in turn move.  Electric damper motors are typically
induction motors operating at 24 Vac (Levenhagen, 1993).  The motor shaft is attached by
a gear set to the blade arm linkage.
Fire dampers and smoke dampers are special classes of dampers and are only used for
safety in fire situations.  Fire dampers are used to stop the spread of fire and confine a fire
to one area of the duct work.  They are built of metals that can withstand fire heat without
losing strength, and are not axially pivoted blades like air flow control dampers.  A fire
damper may be a curtain type, a single blade, multiple blades, or interlocking blades
(Cote, 1991).  A fusible link must melt at a specified temperature, usually 74°C (165°F),
to allow a coiled spring to close a fire damper (Mull, 1998).  The damper will remain
closed until manually reset.  A smoke damper can be pivoted blades like air control
dampers, and can be motor-controlled or spring loaded to close on a smoke sensor signal.
Smoke dampers are typically rated for leaktightness, such as 1% of the duct design air
flow is allowed to leak past the closed blades (Levenhagen, 1993).  This measure is a
means to demonstrate the ability of the unit to control smoke during fire situations.
Controlling smoke means less smoke inhalation exposure to the people who are
evacuating the building, better visibility, and generally less induction of panic among
evacuees.  In a loss prevention sense, controlling smoke means less chance of spreading
the fire, and reduced building damage from smoke and heat.  The smoke dampers are
called for on systems whose capacity exceeds 7,080 liters/second air flow (Grimm, 1998).
These dampers must also withstand high heat from the hot combustion products found in
smoke, but the design codes are usually not as stringent for smoke dampers as for fire
dampers (Levenhagen, 1993).
Tornado dampers are another type of safety damper.  These are used for isolating the
ventilation system when tornado winds cause pressure changes around a building, and
when tornado winds drive outside air through a ventilation system at higher flows than
normal operations.  Typically, ordinary wind will create some pressure changes as it
flows around a building, but the pressures are small, perhaps as much as a few 10’s of
Pascals.  Strong winds could cause 100’s of Pascals pressure change (Simiu, 1986).  Even
this small pressure can cause air to flow from a building toward the low pressure area, but
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tornado force winds can cause thousands of Pascals pressure difference that can reverse
air flow in ventilation systems (Howard, 1983).
The air flow isolation device used in nuclear air ventilation ducts is the air valve.  This
valve is similar to a water flow valve.  These steel butterfly-type valves might be large,
such as 1.2 m (4 feet) flow diameter.  The valves must withstand high pressure (up to
60 psig) and perhaps steam temperatures of several hundred degrees C.  Air operators for
these valves typically require pressure in the 100 psig range (Lish, 1972).  Valve seats can
be elastomer soft seats for a pressure-tight seal.  Sometimes the term “bubble-tight” seal
is used to mean positive results from a field leak test.  The test method applies a water-
and-soap solution to the sealing surface of a valve closed against air pressure on the far
side; if the test does not produce any discernible bubbles from air leaking past the valve
seat then the valve is leak-tight or “bubble-tight”.
Ventilation system filters are used to remove particulate from the air stream.  Particles
can cause safety concerns for personnel and the environment.  Particles also can lead to
problems with the fans.  Particles striking the fan blades cause wear, and over time the
fan can become unbalanced from blade wear.  Particles that are combustible in air can be
ignited by striking the fan impeller, or by the motion of the impeller in the fan casing
(ACGIH, 1995).  Other types of filters, such as charcoal filters, can remove vapors from
the air stream.  The basic type of filter used for nuclear applications is the high efficiency
particulate air (HEPA) filter.  This filter, by law, must remove 99.97% of mono-disperse
particles 0.3 micron diameter (see 29CFR1910.1001) and larger.  However, another part
of the Code of Federal Regulations directs that the HEPA filter reduces emissions by 99%
(an adjustment factor of 0.01) (40CFR61, appendix D).  Since these filters must capture
so many radioactive or toxic particles, the filters are known to accumulate an inventory of
hazardous materials (see DOE, 1997).  Hazardous releases from the filters themselves are
studied, such as filter fires and filter rupture from overpressure or other causes.  There is a
large potential for filter oxidation due to the high air flow that continuously feeds oxygen
(Grimm, 1998).  Filter media are chosen for low flammability, but can still burn under
adverse conditions.  An example of filter release studies is WHC (1996).  Some filter
tests with hydrocarbon fires have showed that the smoke cools before reaching the filters
and particulate loading is not too severe (Hasegawa, 1992), but this result could be
dependent on the amount of combustion mass.
A HEPA filter is constructed of pleated panels of a glass fiber ‘paper’ arranged in a frame
with metal separators between the pleats.  Filters can be either rectangular or circular.
The filter’s glass fiber media gives high efficiency in particle removal from the air, by
particle diffusion into the media, particle impaction onto the media, and particle
interception.  The media depth in the direction of air flow is usually over 30 cm to
provide a large amount of filter material surface area for cleansing efficiency without
creating too much pressure drop across the filter.  Filter pressure drops, also called filter
resistance, can be in the range of 125 to 500 Pa (0.5 to 2 inches of water pressure) (Mull,
1998).  The filter resistance increases as the particulate loading increases.  Filter
replacement is recommended when the filter resistance has doubled, or reached the
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manufacturer’s suggested limit (DOE, 1994).  A HEPA filter weighs on the order of 18
kg for a 28.3 m
3
/minute rated unit of 0.6 m x 0.6 m x 0.3 m deep.  Dirty filters can weigh
another 1.8 kg per 28.3 m
3
/minute (1000 cfm) of rated capacity (Burchsted, 1976).
Rudinger (1990) gives a good summary of HEPA filter construction, operation, and filter
safety issues that face the nuclear industry.  HEPA filters are a relatively fragile
component compared to metal ducts and valves, but they are part of the confinement
barrier.  There are concerns about high humidity air flow to the HEPA, since lading the
glass fiber material with water can reduce the strength of the filter media so that its pleats
might easily tear.  Another concern is about loading with smoke particulate from a fire.
After clogging the filter and having the fire heat and smoke increase building atmosphere
pressure, the filter could fail.  Pressure impulses, such as explosions in the duct work or
sustained tornado winds, a damper spurious closure, or even a high volume cryogen spill
that cools and shrinks, then undergoes boiling expansion that swells the building air
volume could potentially fail one or more filters.  Generally, unusual events of this nature
are needed to fail the filter, and inherent flaws that allow the filter to “leak past”, that is,
to allow unfiltered air flow past the filter, are very rare.  No internal leakage failure rate
attributable to the filter itself was found in the literature for HEPA filters.  HEPA filter
breakthrough means that the filter is saturated and will no longer retain any captured
particulate from the air stream.  Such a filter must be replaced to regain proper air
filtration.  Filter changeouts depend on the particulate concentration at the facility, but
changeouts of every 6 months to a year are not uncommon.  Some facilities that are
relatively clean might operate two years or longer before HEPA changeout (Winegardner,
1993).
Charcoal filters can adsorb gas molecules.  The charcoal is very porous, creating a very
large surface area for gas molecules to diffuse and bond onto the walls of the pores.
Carbon (charcoal) on the order of 0.5 kg can adsorb up to 0.25 kg of gases (Mull, 1998).
The filters are most effective when the air and contaminants are kept in contact with the
filter.  Air velocities under 150 m/minute should be used, and pressure drops for these
filters are on the order of 50 to 75 Pa (0.2 to 0.3 inches of water).  The maximum
operating temperature is about 38°C (100°F).  Higher temperatures can cause the carbon
to desorb gases.
A sand filter consists of multiple beds of sand and gravel.  Air is drawn through these
beds.  The air flows at a velocity of perhaps 1.5 m/minute through the layers of sand.
Then the air is discharged.
Both the HEPA and carbon filters will use a pre-filter to capture the larger diameter
particulate dust before it enters the main filter.  A pre-filter is typically a thin pleated
paper or fiber glass filter that can capture larger micron size particles.  Burchsted (1976)
gave guidance that a pre-filter should always be used to prevent a HEPA from loading up
or “caking” with large diameter particles.  Davis (1999) showed that prefilters can extend
the useful life of HEPA filters.
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A demister is often used in the ventilation system as well.  These units are sometimes
called mist eliminators.  A demister operates to remove moisture droplets, so that filters
do not become loaded with the moisture.  Penicot (1999) showed with experiments that
liquid aerosol particles, smaller than water droplets, tend to clog a HEPA filter slower
than solid aerosols, but there are additional concerns that the liquid will weaken the filter
media or its attachment to the filter frame, allowing the filter to leak air without filtration.
Demisters can come in several types.  Wire mesh screens will capture larger droplets, and
torturous path chevron “wave-plate” units will capture droplets in the 100 micron range.
For capturing small droplets in the 10 micron range, demisters are fiberglass cloth on a
wire mesh matrix.  The resistance (pressure drop) across the filter is on the order of 250
Pa when dry, but this value increases as the demister collects more and more water
(Burchsted, 1976).
2.3 Operating experiences
Some ventilation operating experiences from various nuclear applications are discussed in
this section.
At an experimental fission power reactor at the Idaho National Engineering and
Environmental Laboratory (INEEL), a review of two recent years’ of log book entries
revealed these types of faults and concerns with the facility ventilation systems:
•  Fan motor grounded, fan not operating
•  Fan spurious trips (unknown reason, fan restarted)
•  Fan vibration trips, fan successfully restarted each time
•  Fan speed controller trips, fan successfully restarted each time
•  Bad bearings found in fan shaft, fan was taken out of service to install a new bearing
•  Fan belt failure in a belt drive, belt replaced and retensioned
•  Fan belts loose, tightened belts
•  Smoke dampers not found at a location in the ventilation system, even though they
were
specified as being in that location in the system design
A Department of Energy report (DOE, 1994) has also documented ventilation system
operating experiences at DOE facilities.  That work reviewed DOE occurrence reports
that dealt with ventilation components or systems.  The most important issues found in
that report are discussed here.  One facility found that the ventilation system was failing
surveillance tests since the air filters were dirty and were not being changed periodically.
The filters had been in place for up to 18 months without changeout.  In other facilities,
workers accidentally bumping switches and/or motor starters, causing fans to lose
electrical power.  Most of the cases were due to close quarters where the switches were
located.  Another facility was undergoing maintenance on fans.   One fan shut down; the
other fan was not sending enough air flow.  Investigation revealed that a process damper
had been pinned in place so that it would not respond to actuation.  The damper had a
history of difficulty with its pneumatic actuator, so it had been pinned in a fixed position.
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The damper was changed to a manual open/close damper.  In a configuration
management problem, an operating procedure did not reflect the system configuration.
With preventive maintenance being performed on a computer control system, power to
the computer was secured.  An interlock then also shut down the facility ventilation
system, and it remained off for nearly 2 hours.  Another facility was supposed to annually
test its air filters using a standard chemical material called dioctyl phthalate (DOP).  The
facility was testing the filters at every 15 months rather than 12 months.
Several equipment aging problems were also noted.  In a test to simulate the loss of off-
site power, a control system relay failed to change state, so the ventilation system did not
restart on alternate power.  Several relays were found to be aged; they were replaced.
Some ventilation fans were powered by electricity from diesel generators, and the diesel
engines had wear problems.  Typically for fusion, the systems are considered to be
powered from off-site electrical power, not from dedicated diesel generator units.  Some
other aging problems were fan rotor bearing failures (overheating, smoking, noises from
running rough, etc.).  Some air filters (13 of 45 at one facility) were found to be defective,
physically separated from their frames so that air could pass through unfiltered.  This
discovery is comparable to the percentage quoted by Wilhelm (1987), who suggested that
up to 15% of filters in service are leaking air past the filter media due to pleat tearing and
media separation from the frame.  The leaking air filters showed an efficiency of 97.90%,
while they should have had an efficiency of 99.95%.  Some safety work has taken into
account reduced filter efficiency by giving degraded filters a reduced efficiency of 90%
(Holland, 1991).  In environmental impact studies, HEPA filter failure scenarios give the
filters zero filtration (NPR, 1991).
Fans showed many problems in the occurrence reports, followed by modest numbers of
filter problems, the circuit breakers, motors, controllers and instruments, dampers,
electrical connections, relays, ducts, gaskets, and switches.  Fortunately, quite often fans
are sized to 100% capacity, so only one fan operating will provide adequate air flow for
an area or facility.  This redundancy is quite useful to allow on-line maintenance of failed
units.
Moeller (1975) cataloged other nuclear industry experiences.  These experiences showed
that fires and explosions have occurred in ventilation systems, particularly in power plant
off-gas systems that handle hydrogen gas.  Filters have also become contaminated with
moisture, lubricating oil, and process chemicals, such as acids.  Isolation butterfly valves
have been noted to not fully close due to debris accumulation in the valves.  Other
miscellaneous problems included fans not being turned on, nitrogen gas purge flow
continued during a filter changeout, and a fan wired to rotate in the wrong direction.
Moeller (1979) then cataloged other, later experiences with these systems.  Sampling air
and monitors in ventilation systems gave half of the reported failure events in the period
1975 to 1978.  The air sampler failures did not detract from system operation, but did
cause problems in meeting specifications for testing the air.  An important event from
1976 was also mentioned there, ice buildup in the upper portion of an exhaust stack at a
boiling water reactor.  Exhaust air backed up into the off-gas building.  The air was rich
14
in hydrogen, and the hydrogen deflagrated.  The off-gas building was demolished
(Bertini, 1980).  Further work by Moeller (1983) showed that fan cooling coils have had
leaks, in some cases very large leaks (380 m
3
 or 100,000 gallons) before the leak was
discovered and the water could be isolated.  Various blower failures were given, as well
as cases of dampers failing to change state, depleted charcoal adsorber and air filter
plugging.  Hydrogen monitors also gave problems, not reading correctly.  Jacox (1989)
carried on with the experience work, noting spurious alarms from radiation monitors,
failures of toxic gas detectors, and water admission into activated carbon filters.
There are also some ventilation system general safety concerns and issues from the
literature.  Ventilation systems have been known to retain particulate in their ducts.  The
Pacific Northwest Laboratory and the Rocky Flats facility have discussed the holdup of
plutonium dusts in the duct work (Haggard, 1996; Beckman, 1993).  A facility in
Kazakhstan was said to have had beryllium dust held up in the ventilation system, and
during a process deviation from normal, the dust exploded (OHS, 1990; NW, 1990).
Toxic and combustible dusts are not the only substances held up in ventilation systems.
Grimm (1998) and Levenhagen (1993) also discuss that the bacteria Legionalla
pneumophilia has grown in trays or pans for condensate water collection and
humidification in ventilation systems, and while no outbreak of Legionnaire’s disease is
officially attributed to the bacteria, exposure to the bacteria is not safe.
Another important aspect of ventilation is that the system ducts can become a conduit to
bypass confinement if the system isolation valves do not function to seal the ducts when
needed.  Unless the ducts are sealed, unwanted consequences can occur.  Lees (1996)
gave an example of ducts propagating an unwanted event.  A phenolic resin plant in New
Jersey was handling resin powder.  The probable chain of events was that a bearing in a
hammer mill shredder overheated, causing resin powder in the mill to overheat.  The
powder passed on to the dust collector.  A dust explosion occurred in a dust collector, and
the explosion shock waves traveled down the process ducts and broke through them,
emerging at several locations in the facility.  The released shock wave pressure energy
raised clouds of resin dust in the plant.  Those dust clouds exploded in several violent
secondary explosions.  Five people were killed in the explosions, over 20 more were
injured.  This event illustrated how the ducts can channel explosive energy to result in a
much higher consequence event.  Ventilation systems may have combustible dusts or
vapors confined in the ducts and filters.  Confining a combustible material could allow a
subsonic deflagration event that yields modest overpressure energy to accelerate to a
supersonic detonation event that yields very high overpressure energy.  Deflagration to
detonation transition is due to shock wave reflection and buildup, and pre-heating of the
unreacted media in a confined area.  When combustibles are going to be handled at a
facility, the ventilation system can incorporate several protective features.  Some of these
features are dust (or other material) collectors to keep concentrations below combustible
levels and detection sensors to monitor concentration of the combustible substance.  An
example of monitoring is a combustible gas monitor that alarms at 25% of the lower
flammable limit of the gas in air.  The ventilation system can be fitted with explosion
vents to direct explosion energy into inconsequential and unmanned areas, explosion
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suppression systems that quickly act to break up the combustion wave front, and blow out
panels so that overpressure is dissipated without damage to people or equipment.
Ventilation systems also can be compromised by intake of air that is not fresh and clean.
Industrial complaints have occurred when air intakes draw in exhaust emissions from
vehicles, smoke from fires, or other contaminants.  Air intakes must be situated to avoid
taking in such gases and aerosols.  Modifications to an existing facility must also be
planned to preclude introducing emissions near building air intakes.
Another component of potential concern in the ventilation system is the exhaust air
ejector, or stack.  Exhaust air stacks, or facility vent stacks, are chimneys that allow air
leaving the facility to be lofted into the atmosphere.  Some designs use a fan penthouse on
the building roof to loft air upward (no stack is used); other designs use fans at the top of
the stack to give extra upward velocity to the air as it leaves the stack for better mixing in
the atmosphere.  Stacks may pose special concerns with ventilation systems.  The type of
stack is important to determine if it will pose any concerns about air exhaust flow.  In
some stacks, a liner of brick is used, and it has been noted at coal-fired power plants that
the liner bricks can begin to buckle or lean (Makansi, 1985; Bretz, 1989).  This liner
swelling or leaning could lead to reduced flow area.  Reducing flow area will mean
increased air velocity that can erode the liner material and lead to stack sidewall leakage.
Liner buckling could possibly lead to reduction in flow out the stack.  Metal plate liners
could also warp or swell.  Stacks must also be checked periodically to verify that they are
not plugged by animal encroachment, such as bird nests, etc., rain water accumulation, or
ice formation during winter months.  Stacks can be very tall (perhaps 30 m tall) and
slender, so they may be susceptible to seismic events.  Chen (1993) gives a seismic
analysis of a 53.34-m tall stack.  Stacks also have radiation monitors to track any
radioactive exhaust.  Some facilities have had difficulty with lightning striking on or near
the stack radiation monitors.
From these operating experiences, some events of concern are noted that should be
analyzed in a facility safety assessment:
Partial loss of ventilation air flow (fan fault, fan inadvertently de-energized)
Complete loss of ventilation air flow (fan or control system fault, damper failing shut,
loss of site power, etc.)
Ventilation air flow reversal (stack plugging, atmospheric pressure change, etc.)
Loss of filtration efficiency (HEPA filter failure allows air to leak past, or filter depletion)
Complete loss of filtration (filter rupture, etc.)
Loss of ventilation zone pressure difference (e.g., filter plugging, damper fault)
Loss of ventilation (air cooling) leads to plant equipment overheating and shut down
Loss of ventilation leads to combustible gas or dust accumulation
Ventilation duct leakage (duct wall cracking, weld failure by vibration, etc.)
Failure to isolate ventilation after an airborne release would allow a stack release after
filtration (note that HEPA filtration is not effective on vapors)
Filter fire, releases captured particulate
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Filter failure, (e.g., overpressure, steam-induced tearing, etc.) releases captured particulate
Most of these events cause a loss of the typical pressure zones shown in Figure 1 that
confine radiological or toxicological materials.  The materials could then migrate or be
released from confinement.
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3.  VENTILATION SYSTEM PERSONNEL SAFETY ISSUES
This chapter contains information about issues of personnel safety in working with
ventilation systems.  Facility designs often rely on the ventilation system to dilute
concentrations of hazardous airborne chemicals or control the spread of dusts in the
workplace.  Therefore, one personnel safety issue is the ventilation system not operating
or not performing to move adequate quantities of air to keep personnel exposures to
minimum acceptable levels.  The reliability of the system is important for day-to-day
personnel safety if small quantities of radiologically or toxicologically hazardous
materials are known to be released to the facility atmosphere.  The operating ventilation
system will remove these small quantities and reduce chronic exposures to the facility
personnel.
Ventilation systems are often used to supply air for transferring heat from operating
equipment, such as electrical power distribution system cabinets (motor control centers,
switch centers, etc.), computerized control equipment, and any other equipment or
apparatus that can effectively be cooled by flowing air.  Some large electrical motors use
ventilation air to cool the motor windings.  Using ventilation for cooling means that
ventilation is an important support system for other plant equipment.  Ventilation failure
could lead to loss of electrical power when overtemperature limits cause circuit breakers
to open, or erroneous control signals in control computers overheat, or motor loss of
function when windings overheat and subsequently arc through damaged insulation.
Another safety issue is plant equipment overheating and shutdown after ventilation is
interrupted.
Personnel also require air cooling so that their physical activity in the facility does not
lead to heat stress.  Generally, operators will have the room temperature limits specified
in ASHRAE standards for buildings, along with the requirements for moving set amounts
of cubic feet per minute per person to assure air cleanliness.  Maintainers have room
temperature limits described by Bongarra (1985).
Personnel safety was surveyed using a personnel safety master logic diagram
(Cadwallader, 1999) to identify those energies and hazardous conditions that pose threats
to operations and maintenance personnel.  Tables 3 and 4 give the results of that survey.
A list of preventive maintenance (PM) tasks would include:
pre-filter cleaning or replacement
particulate filter DOP test for filtration efficiency
particulate filter changeout; e.g., HEPA filter replacement.  Standards recommend using
bag-in/bag-out filter changes and using respirators, goggles, gloves and protective
clothing for the safety of maintenance personnel (AIHA, 1992; DOE, 1999).
vapor filter regeneration or media changeout, e.g., activated carbon filter renewal
duct and filter leaktightness test
scrubber cleaning
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demister cleaning or replacement
motor PM, including examination of lubrication sumps, adding lubricant
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Table 3. Potential ventilation safety issues for operations personnel
Energy source for
exposure to operators Origin of energy source
Acoustic energy Air movement noise in ducts, grille, louvers, and
diffusers (whistling, etc.); air leakage noise from ducts,
fans; fan operation noise
Chemical energy Possibility of dust and other irritants building up in ducts
and being distributed in the facility.  Substandard
ventilation will allow process materials to build up in the
work areas, this could be hazardous.
Electrical energy Static electricity can accumulate unless air relative
humidity is kept above 55%.
Kinetic energy Rotating shaft energy in fans, possible impact by fan
blade pieces or by objects thrown by fan blades
Mechanical energy Exposed damper linkage arms can bind or pinch, valve
stems could also pinch.
Pressure energy Air is generally low pressure in these systems, there
could be exposure from steam heating coils or water
cooling coils for air treatment.  That is outside the scope
of this study.  There could be pneumatic drive systems
for dampers, operating at low pressure, perhaps 15 psig.
Radiation energy The only ionizing radiation sources could be radioactive
particle plate out on the duct walls, and accumulation of
radioactive materials in the air filters.
No non-ionizing radiation sources are known to be used
in ventilation systems, besides the small electromagnetic
fields from electric motors.
Thermal energy Possible exposure from steam heating coils or water
cooling coils for air treatment.  Recall one air cooler
leaked a very large amount of water in a facility.
If ventilation does not cool facility air adequately,
personnel could overheat.  This is especially true if they
are in anti-contamination clothing, performing heavy
labor, etc.
Vibration energy Unbalanced fan blades can vibrate the fan casing and
duct.  Poor duct design can allow air flow-induced
vibration of ducts.  This leads to noise and mechanical
vibration.
Biological hazard (fungi) Fungi could grow in humid ducts, exposing personnel as
air passes over the growth.  This is sometimes referred to
as “Sick Building Syndrome.”
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 Table 4. Potential ventilation safety issues for maintenance personnel
Energy source for
exposure to maintainers Origin of energy source
Acoustic energy Air leakage noise from ducts, fans; fan and compressor
operation noise
Chemical energy Possibility of dust and other irritants building up in duct
work.  Welding fumes could be present in some
maintenance, such as a duct patching or replacement task.
Exposure to lubricants, such as grease and bearing oil.
Electrical energy Motive power to fan motors (480 V and higher), damper
motors (24 V), and valve motors.  Power to tools used for
maintenance, instrumentation power.
Gravitational energy Working at heights to access overhead ducts and diffusers,
fan lofts, roof units,  etc.  Objects (tools, filters, etc.) could
be dropped onto workers.  Cranes might be used to hoist
equipment, such as fan motors, so the possibility of a
dropped load must be considered.
Kinetic energy Rotating shaft energy in fans, keep clear to avoid being
wrapped on shaft.  Possible impact by fan blade pieces or
by objects thrown by fan blades
Mechanical energy Damper louvers and linkage arms could pinch.  Filter
replacement could allow pinching of hands or arms.  Belt
driven equipment could provide pinch points for workers.
Pressure energy Air is generally low pressure in these systems, there could
be exposure from steam heating coils or water cooling
coils for air treatment.  Water could flood.  There could be
pneumatic drive systems for dampers, operating at low
pressure.  Some tools might operate under pressure, such
as water sprays for duct cleaning, pneumatic wrenches, etc.
Radiation energy The only ionizing radiation sources could be radioactive
particle plate out on the duct walls, or accumulation in the
air filters.
Small electromagnetic fields from fan motors and powered
tools.  Welding gives off ultraviolet light.
Thermal energy Possible exposure from steam heating coils or water
cooling coils for air treatment.  Water could flood.
Maintenance tools, such as welding to patch a duct, could
expose workers to heat.
Vibration energy Unbalanced fan blades can vibrate the fan casing and duct
work.  Tools may also vibrate.
Biological hazard (fungi) Fungi could grow in humid duct work, exposing personnel
as air passes over the growth.  Periodic duct cleaning
activities could lead to high exposures.
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valve adjustment and PM, including examination of lubrication sumps, adding lubricant,
valve seal cleaning and/or replacement
fan blade balancing, fan blade cleaning and inspection for blade material integrity
AHU liner integrity inspection
fan vibration tests
drive belt inspection
duct cleaning
instrument calibration (temperature, humidity, and pressure instruments)
air sampling for contaminants
air flow and air flow balance testing
system isolation testing
As mentioned briefly in section 2, filters accumulate radioactive or hazardous particulate.
Used filters must be treated with care during replacement and disposal.  The event
referred to in section 2 discussed how used glovebox HEPA filters were being compacted
for disposal by shredding with a knife shredder machine.  The filters released Curium-
244, which led to worker inhalation exposures despite respirator protection (DOE, 1997).
The typical walkdown inspection is not as detailed as the PM tasks.  A daily walkdown is
intended to sense if any equipment is not functioning correctly.  Sensing the heat in the
equipment area, the noise the equipment produces, detecting smoke and smelling any
smells of overheating; these are walkdown tasks.  Issues to note could be bearings
“singing” that denote bearing chafing that leads to bearing failure, or the sizzling noise or
“bacon frying” sound of a cavitating water coolant pump.  Vibration noise of fan blades
not spinning true (i.e., precessing on the fan shaft) and equipment mounting tightness are
daily walkdown items to note.  Other visual inspection guidance is given by the ASME
(1989), including the condition of housekeeping, damage to instrumentation, verifying
that sample port plugs are in place, verifying that seals on the system are not leaking, etc.
Bloch (1985) also has some discussion about PM tasks.  When blowing dust from fan
motor windings, air pressure over 50 psig will blow dust under insulation tape and the
blowing dust can damage the surface of insulation.  Inspection of liners in AHUs and duct
work is important to determine if liner debris will be spreading throughout the system.
A list of corrective maintenance tasks would include:
fan replacement
drive belt replacement
fan motor replacement
instrument replacement
valve repacking, valve replacement
Industrial HVAC operators agree that proper maintenance is the single greatest influence
on HVAC equipment lifetime (McRae, 1988).  Some average service lifetimes before
replacement for fans are 10 to 20 years, depending on the fan type and duty factor, and 10
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years for blade dampers (McRae, 1988).  Some other estimates are for ducts, the life of
the facility; gauges, 15 years; fresh air louvers made of steel, 15 years; compressors, 20
years (Akalin, 1978).  Unfortunately, these authors did not discuss the times for
maintenance actions.  Equipment useful lifetimes are important for reliability and
economics calculations.  Many of the cited equipment lifetimes are shorter than facility
lifetime.  Fusion experiment facilities are operated typically on the order of 15 years, and
a fusion power plant may be operated on the order of 40 to 60 years.  Therefore, major
equipment replacement tasks are expected to occur, with their attendant hazards of crane
lifts, complete electrical and support system isolation lockout tagout, uncovering
openings in the facility, prolonged work in confined spaces, and other hazards of
equipment replacement.
To provide for maintainer safety, work planners must recall that ventilation systems have
several support systems that must have energy lock-outs performed to prevent injuries
during maintenance tasks.  The support systems are electrical power, perhaps a plant
compressed air supply, water supplies, and instrumentation and control signal interfaces.
Fan sizes and types will set specific input power requirements, but 480 Volt systems are
not uncommon for moving reasonably large amounts of air, and 4160 Volt units move
very large amounts of air.  Damper motors are typically controlled using 24 Volt power or
plant air.  Compressed air for damper positioning is often operated in the 3 to 15 psig
range.  Since occupational safety and health regulations state that personnel exposure to
compressed air for cleaning shall be less than 30 psig (CFR, 1999), the lower pressures of
3 to 15 psig are within safe levels.  The reader will recall that Bloch (1985) suggested less
than 50 psig to use for removing dust from motor windings; under 30 psig should be used
to comply with regulations.  Even less than 30 psig may still raise particulate from
ventilation duct walls.  Particulate can be nuisance dusts or more hazardous materials.
Working at heights must include proper safety precautions.  An event in 1977 (DOE,
1980) illustrated this point.  A maintenance craftsman was fatally injured after being
catapulted 25 feet from the roof of a building to the ground.  The accident occurred while
lowering an air conditioner cooling coil from the roof with a mobile hoist unit.
Ventilation systems have been known to accumulate hazardous particulate in the duct
work, for example, the glovebox ventilation ducts at Rocky Flats accumulated plutonium
as discussed in section 2.  Maintenance personnel can be exposed to various chemical
substances from aerosol and particulate buildup on the interior surfaces of ducts if duct
cleaning, maintenance of fans, valves, or instruments require a duct to be opened.
Another issue of concern is mold growth in water collection trays and on the duct pipe
walls.  Mold can also grow in humidification pans and transmit to the duct walls.
Instrumentation, such as manometers or pitot tubes, can become contaminated and must
be handled with caution.
Some ventilation system tasks might require personnel entry into AHUs or filter arrays
for cleaning or inspection.  When personnel enter those areas, confined space entry
procedures are needed (CFR, 1999a).
28
A key feature in protecting maintenance personnel is to inspect the ventilation systems
and assess what hazards exist before performing any tasks.  With hazards characterized,
then proper controls can be established to provide for safe work.
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4. VENTILATION SYSTEM COMPONENT FAILURE RATES
This section gives component failure rates for the major ventilation system components
described in chapter 2.  In general, nuclear component failure rates have been surveyed
and selected for application for fusion usage.  Some non-fission data have been given
here for comparison to the fission values.
4.1 Component failure rates
Table 5 gives failure rates for ventilation system components.  The failure modes and
statistical error are also given in the table.  These values have come primarily from
nuclear fission sources, which does not pose any large error since the applications are
very similar.  Several published sources of ventilation system studies (Sarver, 1975;
Durant, 1980; Khan, 1991) were consulted along with the system description in Chapter 2
to determine the necessary components to be included in the data set development.  The
data in the table come from matured components and are constant failure rate values.
Lofaro (1993) cited 6 months as the burn-in time for ventilating system components.
Failure rate data could not be found for a few components listed in section 2.  The air
sampling system was one of those.  Alber (1995) gave a failure rate value for an INEEL
chemical sampling system using a needle probe for sample pickup.  The chemical sampler
failure rate of 1E-05/hour was for all failure modes, with an error factor of 8.  Until
further data are found, then using an air sampler failure rate in the 1E-05/hour range is
probably adequate.  Vessel vent systems were not included here since these systems are
specialized equipment.  Some treatment of rupture disks and other vent equipment is
found in Cadwallader (1998).  Condensers were not treated for the same reason as vessel
vent systems.  Fire suppression systems have been assigned some data in Cadwallader
(1995).  Heat removal systems were not treated since these are also not germane to the
ventilation confinement function for fusion systems; the same reason holds for criticality
drains.  Blanton (1993) gave some values for fan coolers (fails to start, 1E-02/d with error
factor of 5, and fails to run, 1E-05/h with an error factor of 3).  Alber (1995) gave an
overall ventilation system failure rate for ‘all modes’ of 2.4E-05/h with an error factor of
6.9, and a ventilation system leakage failure rate of 5.24E-06/h with an error factor of 6.8.
A conservative upper bound failure to isolate a ventilation system on release of hazardous
material to room air has been estimated at 1E-02/d (Holland, 1991).
Some operational data on air detritiation systems is given in Cadwallader (1993).
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Table 5.  Ventilation system component failure rates
Component Failure mode
Recommended
average failure
rate
Error factor Reference
Fan Fails to run 3E-05/h 10 Eide, 1990
Fails to start 5E-03/d 5 Eide, 1990
Duct Leakage 1E-09/h-m 10 Eide, 1990
Blockage none for > 10 cm
diameter piping
-- --
Pre-Filter Internal leakage 3E-06/h 10 Blanton ,1993
Plugging 3E-06/h 10 Blanton, 1993
HEPA filter Internal leakage 3E-06/h 10 Blanton, 1993
Plugging 1E-05/h 10 Eide, 1990
Damper Fail to
open/close
3E-03/d 5 Eide, 1990
Spurious
operation
3E-07/h 10 Eide, 1990
Butterfly valve “all modes” 1.2E-06/h 30 IAEA (1988)
Fail to open 1E-03/d 10? assumed
Pressure
monitor
Fail to operate 1E-06/h 3 Cadwallader,
1998
Thermocouple
temperature
monitor
Fail to operate 1E-06/h 3 Cadwallader,
1998
Radiation
monitor
Fail to operate 1E-06/h 10 Cadwallader,
1998
Exhaust stack Leakage 1E-08/h-m 10 Cadwallader,
1998
Fire or smoke
damper
Fails on
demand
2.7E-04/d 4.4 Eide, 1990
Spurious
operation
1E-08/h 3 Eide, 1990
Demister Fail to run 1E-04/h 10 Blanton, 1993
Scrubber, wet Fail to start on
demand
1E-02/d 10 Cadwallader,
1998
Fail to operate 8E-06/h 10 Cadwallader,
1998
Scrubber, dry Plugging 1E-04/h 10 Cadwallader,
1998
Internal leakage 1E-05/h 10 Cadwallader,
1998
Sand filter Plugging 3E-06/h 10 Eide, 1990
Internal rupture 5E-07/h 10 Blanton, 1993
Internal leakage 3E-06/h 10 Blanton, 1993
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Table 6.  Ventilation system failure rate comparisons
Component Failure mode
Recommended
average failure
rate
Comparison
failure rate
value
Comparison
results
Fan Fails to run 3E-05/h 4E-06/h     AM Poor
Fails to start 5E-03/d --
Duct Leakage 1E-09/h-m 6E-07/h     AM duct - Poor
Blockage none for > 10 cm
diameter piping
none
Pre-Filter Internal leakage 3E-06/h 1.2E-06/h   AM Good
comparison
Plugging 3E-06/h
HEPA filter Internal leakage 3E-06/h
Plugging 1E-05/h 1.2E-06/h   AM Fair
Damper Fail to
open/close
3E-03/d --
Spurious
operation
3E-07/h
Butterfly valve “all modes” 1.2E-06/h -- --
Pressure
monitor
Fail to operate 1E-06/h 2.3E-05/h   AM General sensor
value was
3E-06/h, Good
comparison
Thermocouple
temperature
monitor
Fail to operate 1E-06/h 1.2E-05/h   AM Fair
Radiation
monitor
Fail to operate 1E-06/h --
Exhaust stack Leakage 1E-08/h-m --
Fire or smoke
damper
Fails on
demand
2.7E-04/d --
Spurious
operation
1E-08/h
Demister Fail to run 5E-06/h --
Scrubber, wet Fail to start on
demand
1E-02/d --
Fail to operate 8E-06/h
Scrubber, dry Plugging 1E-04/h --
Internal leakage 1E-05/h
Sand filter Plugging 3E-06/h --
Internal rupture 5E-07/h
Internal leakage 3E-06/h
Note:  Military data were taken from NPRD (1991).  Ground fixed values were used here.  AM stands for ‘all modes’.
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The International Energy Agency agreement on Environmental, Safety and Economic
Aspects of Fusion Power has a task on failure rate data collection.  The participants in
this task agreed to compare their data to independent data sets to determine if there were
any wide discrepancies in the data being used for fusion safety studies.  The agreement
was if data were within a factor of 3, then the data compared well, or good.  Within a
factor of 10, the data were fair, and beyond a factor of 10, the data compared poorly.
Such a comparison was made and shown in Table 6.  The results are that some values
were fair comparisons and some were poor.  The first issue to examine in the poor
comparisons was that the military values were ‘all failure modes’ values rather than
failure mode-specific values, so there will be some fractional discrepancy with the values
due to the way the data were calculated and presented.  The poor comparisons are
probably partly due to differences in equipment.  The fan sizes were not given, so it is
possible that the “ground fixed” military fans were not as large as the power plant
ventilation units.  Looking at a fan failure rate from the chemical industry gives an
average failure rate of 9E-06/h (AIChE, 1989), which is in fair agreement with the
nuclear fan value.  The military data had air duct values, but these are probably sheet
metal, not piping.  The nuclear data came from piping, since the nuclear air ducts are steel
piping rather than sheet metal ducts.  The military data did not have piping values in the
data set.  Several other components were not in the military data set.  Scrubbers, dampers,
several types of monitors could not be compared for that reason.
The nuclear values in Table 5 are still suggested for use in safety or risk studies of fusion
facilities, since the data accumulation was on facilities very similar to fusion experiments.
The comparison with military data was an independent check of values, and many of the
values were in the “fair” range.
4.2 Component repair times
Table 7 gives some estimates of repair times for some of the ventilation equipment.  The
industrial group, ASHRAE, did not report maintenance times, they gave yearly
maintenance costs per square foot of facility being served by a ventilation system.  Those
data might yield some useful safety information, but too many assumptions were needed
to arrive at any component-specific repair time data from ASHRAE.  The ASHRAE
values for component lifetimes cited earlier are useful to understand that major
ventilation component replacements will occur once or more over the life of the facility.
Another concern about repair times was that if a ventilation system might become
contaminated, then nuclear ‘as-low-as-reasonably-achievable’ techniques for exposure
and contamination would have to be followed, and these techniques would add time to
the repair tasks.  Therefore, nuclear times are more likely a better data set than
commercial or industrial data.  A good set of nuclear equipment maintenance times is
found in Hannaman (1978), and some of those times are cited here.  Some generalized
major maintenance act time ranges were also given in the WASH-1400 Reactor Safety
Study (NRC, 1975), such as valves, 1 to 350 hours with an average time of 24 hours, and
instruments 0.25 to 72 hours, with an average time of 7 hours.  Equipment tests were
generally in the 0.25 to 4 hour time duration range, with an average of 1 hour duration.
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Table 7.  Repair time estimates for ventilation system components
Component
Recommended
average time to
repair (h)
High estimate
of repair time
(h)
Reference
Fan 40 400 Hannaman,
1978; also
IAEA, 1988
cited a 40 hour
average time
Duct 30 100 Hannaman,
1978
Pre-Filter 0.5 2 Wright, 1987
HEPA filter 2 8 Wright, 1987
Damper 0.6 not given IAEA, 1988
Butterfly valve 1.9 not given IAEA, 1988
Pressure
monitor
6 70 Hannaman,
1978
Thermocouple
temperature
monitor
6 70 Hannaman,
1978
Radiation
monitor
6 70 Hannaman,
1978
Exhaust stack -- --
Fire or smoke
damper
0.6 IAEA, 1988
Scrubber, wet -- --
Scrubber, dry -- --
Sand filter -- --
note:  for a stand-alone blower fan, IAEA (1988) gave a 1.5 hour repair time
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5.  CONCLUSIONS
Ventilation systems are important for confining and controlling chemical and radiological
materials.  This report gives operating experiences and quantitative data on failures and
repair times for ventilation equipment.  These data will be useful for safety studies of
vapor or particulate release in magnetic or inertial fusion experiments.  Individual facility
ventilation system designs will need to be analyzed and modeled with fault trees to
determine the likelihood of a ventilation failure or isolation failure in an accident event.
The experiences discussed in section 2 should help identify accident-initiating events for
modeling.  The failure rate data in section 4 should provide quantification of those fault
trees.  The data in this report may also be useful for maintenance planning, including
issues to routinely examine, issues to address for the safety of personnel, and reliability-
availability-maintainability (RAM) analysis of the system, if needed.
